Overview of Polish/Ottoman History

FOR FOUR hundred years, the Ottoman Empire maintained close diplomatic relations with the Kingdom of Poland under the Piast dynasty, the combined lands of Poland and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania under the Jagiellonian dynasty, and the forma-mixta republic of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. The frontier shared by the two polities stretched from present-day Slovakia, Romania, Moldavia, and into eastern Ukraine, and was the longest frontier shared by a Christian and an Islamic power in the early modern period. Following the partitions of Poland-Lithuania by Russia, Prussia, and Austria at the end of the 18^th century, mass emigrations of Poles prompted by numerous failed uprisings led to the foundation of Polish communities all over Europe and the New World, as well as the Ottoman Empire. Polish émigrés were drawn to the Sublime Porte in hopes of re-creating a Polish state by agitating for conflict with Russia. Their education and abilities, however, caused many to find employment in the Ottoman military and bureaucracy, where they played critical roles in the modernization processes of the Tanzimat period.

Following the first official diplomatic contact in 1414 between King Władysław Jagiełło and Sultan Mehmed I, and throughout the early modern period, Ottoman/Polish relations were critical to the balance of power in Europe and the Black Sea region. The breakdown of these relations often resulted in conflicts that proved disastrous for both polities, and had wide-ranging implications on political and social climates from Safavid Persia to the kingdom of France. As the Polish and Ottoman domains grew in size and their political structures continued to evolve over the centuries, a unique relationship developed between these neighbors. Trade, administrative collaboration, and cultural production emerged from direct and indirect channels of social and political contact, generating new social norms, and powerful cultural and political bonds that remained potent into the modern era.

           Large-scale conflict between the two states, though infrequent, tended to have disastrous effects. Some of these wars figure prominently in popular histories and help to form the basis of modern Polish and Turkish national identities. In 1444, an ill-fated crusade, rare in Polish history, ended at the battle of Varna in an Ottoman victory and the death of Władysław III, the King of Poland and Hungary. The battle of Khotyn in 1621 was a costly Polish-Lithuanian victory that led directly to the regicide of Osman II, the first in Ottoman history. In 1683 Jan Sobieski rode to the aid of the Habsburgs, defeating the Ottoman army under Grand Vizier Kara Mustafa at the second siege of Vienna, which proved to be a high-water mark of Ottoman expansion in Europe. The Bar Confederation, an insurrection shortly before the partitions that dissolved the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth at the end of the 18^th century, touched off the Russo-Turkish war that ended in the treaty of Küçük Kaynarca (1774), dealing a serious blow to Ottoman power vis-à-vis its European neighbors. Within Polish and Turkish historiographies, these conflicts have been portrayed as being deeply linked to the raison d’être of both polities. The Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth gained international prestige and local legitmacy from its assumed role as the antemurale christianitatis (“bulwark of Christendom”) and the Ottoman Empire continued to justify its ruinously expensive wars in Christian Europe and against the Shi’a Safavids by appealing to the gazi (holy warrior) spirit of its orthodox Sunni military classes.

         Despite the often earth-shaking results of the conflicts that arose between Poland and the Ottoman Empire, their shared history was largely spent in official periods of peace. If one may speak of long-term “grand strategies” for Poland and the Ottoman Empire, the maintenance of peaceful relations between these two polities was critical given the frequent conflicts waged with the neighboring powers of Muscovy, Sweden, the Holy Roman Empire/Hungary, Venice, and Safavid Persia. The importance of this bond to the health of both polities is evident in the unique nature of Polish/Ottoman relations throughout the early modern period. Unusually bilateral relations between the Islamic power of the Ottoman Empire and Christian Poland-Lithuania were established through the exchange of “eternal” peace accords (‘ahdnames) beginning in 1533, which were ratified by the Polish Crown and parliament (sejm). Several instances of mutually agreed upon demarcation of boundaries, the first of which was in 1542, were among the earliest of their type in European history. Periods of official and unofficial co-dominium over frontier regions further indicate the special reltionship of these neighboring societies.

Although the Kingdom of Poland and the Ottoman Empire began official diplomatic relations in 1414, both polities were the inheritors of deep historical connections belonging to client populations along their mutual frontier. The rise of the Giray Khans of the Crimea, Ottoman vassals beginning in 1478, was a direct result of the patronage of the Grand Dukes of Lithuania in the late 14^th and early 15^th centuries. The Giray Khans claimed to be the descendants of Chinggis Khan through his son Jochi. The Giray-lead Crimean Khanate was a surviving branch of the Golden Horde, which was founded by Batu Khan, who invaded Poland for the first time in 1241. In this sense, the relationship between Poland and the Ottoman Empire was rooted in a much earlier period. As such, power brokers in Poland-Lithuania were deeply involved in the internal politics of the Crimean Khanate long after it had become an Ottoman vassal and the Porte established regular provinces (eyalets) in Caffa and Silistra/Özi. Polish Kings also asserted historic claims to sovereignty over Moldavia, which became an Ottoman vassal for the first time, though with subsequent interruption, in 1456. Powerful members of the magnateria of Poland-Lithuania were related by blood to ruling families of the Ottoman vassal polities of Moldavia, Wallachia, and Transylvania. As time passed, the involvement of the magnateria and militarized szlachta (nobility/citizenry) in the politics of these Ottoman provinces drew the Commonwealth and Ottoman Empire into several full-scale wars.

The Ottoman Empire created its own inroads to exert considerable influence over the internal politics of Poland-Lithuania, particularly after the death of the Jagiellonian dynasty and the institution of an elected kingship. Rival proFrench and proHabsburg elements within the Polish-Lithuanian citizenry and aristocracy paid close attention to Ottoman reactions during their elective processes. Long-standing Ottoman/French friendship and deep conflict between the Habsburgs/Hungary and the Ottoman Empire meant that the election of a proHabsburg monarch could result in conflict with war with the Sublime Porte. The early elections of Henry Valois (r. 1573-75), the future King Henry III of France, and the Ottoman vassal and Voyevoda of Transylvania Stephen Báthory (r. 1576-86), are prime examples of direct and indirect Ottoman influence in the royal elections of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth.

Bearing in mind the power of the King/Parliament and Sultan/Divan in the shaping of the shared history of Poland and the Ottoman Empire, the daily interactions of the populations ruled by these two polities occurred mainly on their mutual frontier. While Polish rulers and notables maintained constant contact with the Sublime Porte and its clients in the Crimean Khanate, Moldavia, Wallachia, and Transylvania, daily contact between the inhabitants of these polities and their clients occurred along their 1,200 kilometer-long mutual frontier. Called the dzikie pola (“wild field”) by Poles and Ruthenians and the deşt-i kipçak (“Kipchak wasteland”) in Ottoman sources, this geographic zone hosted multiple coinciding and overlapping frontiers, the existence of which had sweeping ramifications for the shared history of Europe and the Islamic world: confessional frontiers of Christendom/the Dar al-Islam as well as Latin/Orthodox lands and major Jewish settlements, political ideological frontiers between republican and dynastic imperial governments, frontiers between settled agriculturalists and pastoral nomads, and environmental frontiers between deciduous forests and the steppe.

The confluence of these social and natural factors created a frontier both deep and broad hosting the growth of liminal societies such as the Cossack brotherhoods and the Nogai Tatars. Vast open spaces and relatively low population density, as well as the extreme distance separating this frontier from the capitals of the Empire and the Commonwealth, meant that peripheral power brokers, vassal polities, and client groups assumed more independent roles than their counterparts in other early modern European frontier contexts. The human and natural geography of this region hindered centralized power structures in their attempts to extend taxation, recruitment, imprisonment/litigation, forced settlement, disarmament, and relocation to frontier populations.

Despite the prevailing peaceful relations enjoyed by Poland-Lithuania and the Ottoman Empire, their mutual frontier was the locus of endemic violence, involving vassal polities, client populations, and militarized segments of both Commonwealth and Ottoman societies. Additionally, the Crimean Khanate, vassals of the Ottoman sultan, enthusiastically engaged in the locally destabilizing Black Sea slave trade resulting in the disappearance of some 2,000,000 individuals from this frontier region between 1500-1700 (Kołodziejczyk, 2006). Polish and Turkish historiographies have separately identified the events of this period related to this frontier as being critical to powerful decline paradigms related to the late 18^th c. partitioning of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, and the weakening of the Ottoman Empire vis-à-vis its European rivals. Romanian and Ukrainian historiographies have also identified events of this period as being critical to nascent national formations- specifically the rebellion of Vlach leader Mihai Viteazul and Zaporozhian Cossack uprisings.

Additionally, Polish/Ottoman relations played a role in the production of normative cultural practices in both polities, which drew local legitimacy and prestige from the defense of Christendom and Islam, respectively. One manifestation of this rivalry, in the case of Poland-Lithuania, was the “Sarmatian” ethos developed by the nobility/citizenry (szlachta), which claimed to have its roots as a class in the nomadic Sarmatian steppe peoples of antiquity. This militarized nobility/citizenry, despite its adherence to a diverse set of Christian sects and firm attachment to the political legacy of republican Rome, adopted a sartorial and martial culture that drew heavily from the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth’s Muslim neighbors, prompting European artists such as Rembrandt to depict Poles in an “oriental” style along with Turks and Arabs.

THE PARTITIONS of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in the second half of the eighteenth century opened a new chapter in the history of mutual contact. Modern Polish historiography maintains the narrative that the Ottoman Empire was the only state that did not recognize the final partition of Poland-Lithuania in 1795 by its neighbouring states: Russia, Prussia and Austria. One of Mustafa Kemal’s colleagues during the War of Independence, Ali Fuat Cebesoy related to Michał Sokolnicki, Polish Ambassador to Ankara in the years 1936-45, an anecdote that is still repeated in Poland. Whenever the diplomatic corps was received at the court of the Sublime Porte, the chef de protocol is said to have asked ‘Where is the deputy from Lehistan?’, and at each occasion he would receive the same reply from an aide, ‘Your Excellency, the deputy of Lehistan could not make it because of vital impediments’ to the annoyance of the deputies of the partitioning states. The partition and disappearance of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in 1795 and the subsequent strengthening of its neighbours, especially Russia, did not go unnoticed in the Ottoman Empire. The catastrophic fate of the northern neighbour was perceived by key Ottoman statesmen as a warning and a definite sign of the urgent need for reform of the Ottoman state.

The November Uprising (1830-31) marked a turning point in the history of Polish political emigration in general, and of the Polish presence in the late Ottoman Empire in particular. Following this armed rebellion against Russia in the semi-autonomous Congress Kingdom, the heartland of the former Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, a mass emigration of political elites took place. Along with France and England, the Ottoman Empire became an important destination for nineteenth century Polish political emigration. Remarkably, the prophecy of a Ukrainian bard called Wernyhora had been gaining popularity since the November Uprising among Poles in exile as well as in the lands of partitioned Poland-Lithuania. The prophecy stated that after a long struggle the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth would regain independence when a Muslim watered his horse in the waters of the Vistula river. Although only a prophecy, Wernyhora’s words became for many a spiritual imperative to turn their hopes towards the Ottoman Empire.

The foundation of the Polish-Ottoman cooperation was set in Paris and London by representatives of the leading political faction in exile called Hôtel Lambert, members of which, in the 1830s, frequently met with the Ottoman diplomats. The Polish intelligentsia in exile regarded the Ottoman Empire as a natural ally against a common enemy, Russia. Poles fled to the Bosphorus from émigré communities in the west as well as from former Polish-Lithuanian territories hoping for Ottoman support in their efforts to regain independence. The number of Polish émigrés within Ottoman borders tended to increase during periods of armed conflict between any potential ally and Russia. Accordingly, major waves of Polish immigration to the Ottoman Empire occurred during the Hungarian Revolution of 1848, the Crimean War (1853-56), the January Uprising in 1863 and finally, during the Russo-Ottoman War (1877-1878).

The important role of the Ottoman Empire in Polish national activities in the nineteenth century was stressed by emblematic events such as the foundation of the Main Agency of the Polish Eastern Mission (Agencja Główna Misji Wschodniej) in Istanbul in 1841, the establishment in 1842 of the Polish village Adampol/Polonezköy, which today is located in the Beykoz district of Istanbul, as well as the organization of the Sultan’s Cossacks’ Division, a cavalry regiment in the Ottoman army during the Crimean War (1853-56), by Michał Czaykowski aka Mehmed Sadık Pasha (1804-1886).  Polish soldiers fought on the Ottoman side of every major conflict against Russia from the Balkans to the Caucasus.

Despite the Ottoman hospitality towards the Polish political émigrés, their presence in the Ottoman Empire was not without some controversy. Polish and Hungarian refugees of the Hungarian Revolution of 1848 have been the subject of research in both Turkish and Polish historiographies. As a consequence of the revolution’s failure, nearly a thousand Polish refugees settled within the borders of the Ottoman Empire. Turkish historiography tends to present the “Refugees’ Issue” (Mülteciler Meselesi) as a question of prestige in the international arena. Complying with Russia’s demands to expel the Polish refugees would have been tantamount to allowing Russia to meddle in Ottoman internal affairs. Historians conclude that the Ottoman Empire’s ability to firmly deny Russia’s demand for the extradition of these refugees was a great success of nineteenth century Ottoman diplomacy. They also stress, however, that this conflict was a prelude to the Crimean War, which was to be fought between the Ottoman Empire and Russia a few years later. Meanwhile, the focus of Polish historiography is above all on the issue of conversion to Islam, which divided the refugees of the 1848 Revolution. To avoid the deportation of the exiles, Ottoman officials offered them the opportunity to convert to Islam and henceforth be considered Ottoman subjects. In return, potential converts were promised personal security and employment in the Ottoman army. The proposal caused discontent back in Paris and among the émigrés in the Ottoman Empire. Many regarded conversion to Islam as tantamount to the rejection of one’s Polish national identity. 

The activities of Polish political émigrés in the Ottoman Empire were not limited to Istanbul. Apart from the capital, they also settled all over the Balkans, on the Black Sea coast and near the border with Iran. Evidently, Polish participation in the Ottoman public sphere was not limited to activities aimed at the restoration of an independent Poland. Rather, Polish émigrés also played an active role in the modernization of the Ottoman state during the era of the Tanzimat reforms (1839-1876). For decades, hundreds of Polish political émigrés pursued various occupations in the Ottoman army, administration, diplomacy, intelligence, road and telegraph construction, health services as well as industry and agriculture in the most remote corners of the empire. The Treaty of Berlin (1878), which concluded the Russo-Ottoman War of 1877-78, marked the symbolic end of Polish organized political activities in the Ottoman Empire. During the reign of Abdülhamid II (r.1876-1909), characterized by political repression, the émigrés no longer enjoyed the same support they had previously received during the Tanzimat period when conspiratorial activities and preparations for national insurrections took place within Ottoman borders.

However, in the years directly preceding World War I, the circle of General Józef Piłsudski, Poland’s future Chief of State, were again determined to cooperate with the Ottoman Empire in their efforts to regain Polish independence. In relation to this, during WWI, the Ottoman Empire once again became an important destination for Polish emigration. As in conflicts past, thousands of Polish deserters from the Russian army found refuge in the Ottoman borders. When Poland regained independence in 1918, several challenges arose for the Polish diplomats on the Bosphorus. In the final years of the Ottoman Empire, Poland resolved to maintain friendly relations with both the Ottoman government in Istanbul and with Mustafa Kemal’s nationalist government in Ankara. One of the main aims of the Polish Foreign Office was to encourage the newly emerging political centre in Anatolia to maintain its distance from Bolshevik Russia and to ensure cooperation with Poland, Turkey’s traditional ally. In general, Polish diplomats were more active than their Ottoman/Turkish counterparts in their efforts to establish cordial political relations between the states. Their efforts were frequently met with apathy, a result of political and economic rapprochement between Turkey and the Soviet Union in the first decade of the Republic.

Traces of the Polish presence in the Late Ottoman Empire can still be found in today’s Turkey. It is reflected in the names of some Beyoğlu streets. Until the 1930s today’s Nur-i Ziya Street – one of the side streets of Istiklal Caddesi - was called Leh Sokağı (“Polish Street”). One of the streets in Tarlabaşı, where Poland’s chief Romantic poet Adam Mickiewicz (1798- 1855) spent the last days of his life, is to this day called Adam Mickiewicz Sokağı. Finally, the most visible sign is certainly the Polish village, Polonezköy, whose inhabitants continue to speak Polish and cultivate a Polish identity and traditions. 

                                                                                                           
-M. Połczyński, P. Dominik